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h i g h l i g h t s
• Effects of U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks on U.S. stock returns are examined.
• Positive U.S. oil production shocks have positive effects on U.S. real stock returns.
• Distinguishing U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks is important at industry level.
• Oil demand and supply shocks are both important in explaining U.S. stock returns.
• U.S. oil production shocks explain 9.6% of automobile industry stock returns.
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a b s t r a c t
Kilian and Park (2009) find shocks to oil supply are relatively unimportant to understanding changes in
U.S. stock returns.We examine the impact of both U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks on U.S. stock returns
in light of the unprecedented expansion in U.S. oil production since 2009. Our results underscore the
importance of the disaggregation of world oil supply and of the recent extraordinary surge in the U.S. oil
production for analysing impact on U.S. stock prices. A positive U.S. oil supply shock has a positive impact
on U.S. real stock returns. Oil demand and supply shocks are of comparable importance in explaining U.S.
real stock returns when supply shocks from U.S. and non-U.S. oil production are identified.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Kilian and Park (2009) present a novel method for examining
the relationship between U.S. stock market behaviour and oil price
shocks. Building on the seminal contribution in Kilian (2009),
which demonstrates that demand and supply shocks in themarket
for oil have different effects on the United States (U.S.) economy
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0/).and the real oil price, they show that the reaction of U.S. real
stock returns to an oil price shock depends on the source of
the underlying cause of the oil price change. One of the major
conclusions in Kilian and Park (2009) is that global oil supply
shocks are much less important than global aggregate and oil-
specific demand shocks in understanding aggregate U.S. stock
market behaviour. Our study is concerned with the question: Do
U.S. oil supply shocks affect U.S. real stock market returns?
After several decades of steady decline in theU.S. oil production,
innovations and new technologies in the extraction of crude oil
have resulted in an unprecedented expansion in U.S. oil production
in recent years. This development is significant because an increase
in U.S. crude oil production directly boosts U.S. domestic income
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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from the U.S. Department of Energy.
compared with an increase in non-U.S. crude oil production.
In addition, enhanced U.S. oil production has consequences for
political and economic security and hence U.S. asset markets
that are likely to be different from increases in non-U.S. oil
production. The recovery of U.S. oil production in recent years is
illustrated in Fig. 1. We investigate the effect of disaggregating
the world oil production variable in Kilian and Park’s (2009)
Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) into U.S. oil production and
non-U.S. oil production. Hendry and Hubrich (2011) argue that
including disaggregated information improves forecast accuracy in
VAR models.
In this study we revisit Kilian and Park’s (2009) analysis to
examine the effect of world oil supply shocks on the U.S. real stock
market returns. We find that both the disaggregation of world oil
supply and the unprecedented surge in theU.S. oil production since
2009 are important factors in determining U.S. real stock returns. A
positiveU.S. oil supply shockhas a positive impact onU.S. real stock
returns that is statistically significant in the fourteenth month and
later. This result is sensitive to the inclusion of recent data that
captures shale oil production. In a sample ending before the start of
shale oil production, a positive U.S. oil supply shock has a positive
statistically significant impact on U.S. real stock returns only in the
twenty-first and twenty-second months.
Variance decomposition analysis shows that by disaggregating
world oil production into U.S. and non-U.S. oil production supply
shocks are comparable to demand shocks (in contrast to the Kilian
and Park (2009) result) in explaining U.S. real stock returns.
2. Data and methodology
We utilize monthly stock and oil market data and examine
the two periods: January 1973 to December 2006, and January
1973 to December 2014. The first period is examined in Kilian
and Park (2009) and the second is an update that incorporates
the oil production expansion in the U.S. in more recent years.
The aggregate U.S. real stock market return (ret t ) is obtained by
subtracting the CPI inflation rate from the log returns on the value-
weighted market portfolio obtained from the Centre for Research
in Security Price (CRSP). The oil supply proxy variables are given
by the per cent changes in non-U.S. oil production (1prodnonUSt )
and in U.S. oil production (1prodUSt ) from the U.S. Department of
Energy. The global real economic activity proxy is the index of real
economic activity (reat ) constructed byKilian (2009). The real price
of oil (rpot ) is U.S. refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil,
from the U.S. Department of Energy since 1974:01 deflated by the
U.S. CPI, with the series extended back to 1973:01 following Barsky
and Kilian (2002).A structural VAR model of order p is utilized to extract the
separate supply and demand-side sources underlying oil price
changes and their relation to the U.S. stock market return:
A0yt = c0 +
p
i=1
Aiyt−i + εt , (1)
where yt = (1prodnonUSt ,1prodUSt , reat , rpot , ret t) is a 5×1 vector
of endogenous variables, A0 denotes the 5 × 5 contemporaneous
coefficient matrix, c0 represents a 5 × 1 vector of constant terms,
Ai refers to the 5 × 5 autoregressive coefficient matrices, and εt
stands for a 5× 1 vector of structural disturbances.
The identifying restrictions on A−10 , as a lower-triangle coeffi-
cient matrix in the structual VARmodel, follows the setup in Kilian
(2009). Kilian (2009) argues that oil production does not respond
to contemporaneous changes in oil demand within a given month
because of the high adjustment cost of changing oil production.
Fluctuation in the real price of oil will not affect global economic
activity within a given month due to the sluggishness of aggregate
economic reaction. The real stock return ordered after oil shocks is
motivated by Lee andNi (2002) andKilian andVega (2011),who ar-
gue that oil prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. macroe-
conomic aggregates within a given month. We assume that non-
U.S. oil production does not respond to U.S. oil supply shockwithin
a given month. The U.S. is an oil importing country whose oil pro-
duction averages 11.5% of the global oil production over January
1973 to December 2014.
3. Empirical results
In Fig. 2 we report the cumulative impulse response of U.S. real
stock returns to negative one standard deviation structural shocks
in non-U.S., U.S., and world oil production over 1973:01–2006:12
and over 1973:01–2014:12. Results for shocks in non-U.S. and U.S.
oil production are obtained from estimation of the five variable
model in Eq. (1) and results for shocks in world oil production are
obtained fromestimating the four variablemodel in Kilian andPark
(2009).
The results in Fig. 2(a) based on data over 1973:01–2006:12 are
in line with the Kilian and Park (2009) paper in that non-U.S. and
U.S. oil production shocks are mostly not statistically significant
in determining U.S. real stock returns. The result for a negative
non-U.S. oil production shock on real stock returns is similar to
the result for a negative world oil production shock on real stock
returns reported by Kilian and Park (2009), and replicated here in
the first diagram in Fig. 2(c).
Fig. 2(b) using data over 1973:01–2014:12 shows a negative
U.S. oil supply shock is associated with a negative response in
U.S. real stock returns that is statistically significant over most of
the horizon. The response of U.S. real stock returns to a negative
shock to non-U.S. oil supply is markedly different from that to a
negative shock to U.S. oil supply. In Fig. 2(b) a negative innovation
in non-U.S. oil supply is associated with a rise in U.S. real stock
returns that is statistically significant or close to being statistically
significant in the fourth through twelfthmonths. This result is hard
to reconcile with the intuition that non-U.S. oil supply disruptions
are associated with a fall in the U.S. stock market.
The result for a negative world oil supply shock on real stock
returns in the Kilian and Park (2009)model over 1973:01–2014:12
are reported in the second diagram in Fig. 2(c). The impulse
responses in the fourth through twelfth months range are positive
and partially statistically significant, indicating a problematic
result for the effect on U.S. real stock returns of both world oil
supply and non-U.S. oil supply shocks for the 1973:02–2014:12
sample.
178 W. Kang et al. / Economics Letters 145 (2016) 176–181(a) Five variable model: 1973:01–2006:12.
(b) Five variable model: 1973:01–2014:12.
(c) Four variable model (Kilian and Park, 2009).
(d) Five variable model with GFC dummy variable: 1973:01–2014:12.
Fig. 2. Response of U.S. real stock return to negative oil production shocks. Notes: Each diagram shows the cumulative impulse response of U.S. real stock return to negative
one standard deviation structural shock in non-U.S., U.S., and world oil production. Results for shocks in non-U.S. and U.S. oil production are obtained from estimation of the
five variable model in Eq. (1) and results for shocks in world oil production are obtained from estimating the four variable model in Kilian and Park (2009). Point estimates
are reported with one-standard error bands constructed using a recursive-design wild bootstrap. The exogenous global financial crisis (GFC) dummy variable is set equal to
1 for the months 2008:09, 2008:10 and 2008:11, and 0 otherwise.
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Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return: 1973:01–2006:12.
Horizon Non-U.S. oil supply
shock





1 0.000 (0.01) 0.001 (0.07) 0.005 (0.36) 0.041 (1.22) 0.954 (25.36)
3 0.003 (0.25) 0.001 (0.06) 0.009 (0.55) 0.061 (1.63) 0.926 (21.73)
12 0.019 (0.99) 0.028 (1.30) 0.029 (1.40) 0.074 (2.09) 0.850 (18.96)
24 0.061 (2.63) 0.056 (2.00) 0.053 (2.42) 0.095 (2.89) 0.735 (16.22)
60 0.067 (2.92) 0.074 (2.26) 0.065 (2.89) 0.103 (3.38) 0.692 (14.92)
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return. The values in parentheses represent the
absolute t-statistics when coefficients’ standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.Table 2
Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return: 1973:01–2014:12.
Horizon Non-U.S. oil supply
shock





1 0.001 (0.09) 0.001 (0.09) 0.002 (0.24) 0.006 (0.48) 0.990 (44.90)
3 0.006 (0.48) 0.012 (0.61) 0.005 (0.49) 0.012 (0.74) 0.966 (33.62)
12 0.019 (1.14) 0.031 (1.25) 0.027 (1.56) 0.037 (1.79) 0.885 (23.76)
24 0.056 (2.59) 0.042 (1.69) 0.042 (2.22) 0.063 (2.71) 0.798 (20.71)
60 0.063 (2.86) 0.056 (2.10) 0.049 (2.54) 0.067 (2.95) 0.766 (19.16)
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return. The values in parentheses represent the
absolute t-statistics when coefficients’ standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.The difference in the results for the original sample in Kilian
and Park (2009) and the full sample, suggests that the model for
the full sample is influenced by the events of increased U.S. shale
oil production (since 2007) and with the global financial crisis
(GFC). We will add a dummy variable set to 1 for the key financial
crisis months 2008:09–2008:11, and otherwise zero, in Eq. (1).1
In the monthly data real stock returns in September, October
and November are an extraordinary run of −9.89%, −17.60% and
−6.69%, respectively.
The cumulative impulse responses of U.S. real stock return
to negative one standard deviation structural shocks in non-U.S.
and in U.S. oil production over 1973:01–2014:12 with a dummy
variable for the GFC in Eq. (1) appear in Fig. 2(d). The presence of
a dummy variable for the GFC reduces the distinctiveness of the
effects of shocks to non-U.S. oil production and U.S. oil production
on real stock returns. In particular, the presence of the GFC dummy
variable mutes the anomalous result of a positive effect on real
stock returns of a negative shock to non-U.S. oil production.
The finding that shocks to U.S. oil production are positively
associated with real stock returns is robust to inclusion of the
GFC dummy variable. With recognition of the GFC, a negative
shock to U.S. oil production has negative effects on U.S. real stock
returns, and the effects are statistically significant in the sixth
month and in the fourteenth month and later. In a sample over
1973:01–2006:12, a positive U.S. oil supply shock only has a
statistically significantly positive impact on U.S. real stock returns
in the twenty-first and twenty-second months. These results
underscore the importancewhen examining U.S. real stock returns
of the disaggregation of world oil production into U.S. and non-U.S.
oil supply components following the ‘‘Shale Revolution’’.
We compute forecast error variance decomposition to address
the important question of how much of the variation in U.S. real
stock returns is due to each structural shock in the crude oil
market. Tables 1 and 2 show the average contributions of each
structural shock to the total variation in U.S. real stock returns
1 The months 2008:09–2008:11 are associated with the GFC for the following
reasons. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008,
and the stock market declined sharply. The week of October 6–10 was the worst
week for the stock market since 1933 with the S & P’s 500 index losing 18.2%.
The GFC appears to have stabilized by the end of November 2008 with the U.S.
Federal Reserve pledging to purchase mortgage bonds guaranteed by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.over 1973:01–2006:12 and over 1973:01–2014:12. It shows that
by disaggregating world oil supply into U.S. and non-U.S. oil
supply shocks, demand and supply shocks are comparable in
explaining the variation in U.S. real stock returns. In the period
1973:01–2006:12, supply shocks explain 14.1% of the variation in
U.S. real stock returns, while demand shocks explain 16.8% after 60
months. Over 1973:01–2014:12, supply shocks account for 11.9%
anddemand shocks account for 11.6% of variations of U.S. real stock
returns after 60 months. For a model in which oil production is
consolidated as world oil production, supply shocks forecast 6.8%
of the variation in U.S. real stock returns over 1973:01–2014:12.
4. Effects of oil supply shocks on real stock returns across
industries
To shed light on the nature of the information contained in
the U.S. oil production we examine whether the effects of the
structural oil market shocks on real stock returns differ across
industries. If the main channel of the U.S. oil production-stock
market index correlation is limited to the oil production related
sector, then it seems reasonable treating the recent U.S. oil
production increase as a positive supply innovation. We report
forecast error variance decomposition results for sector real stock
returns for the four industries considered by Kilian and Park
(2009) in Table 3.2 These industries are the petroleum and natural
gas industry, because of possible ownership of oil resources; the
automotive industry, because it may be sensitive to energy prices;
the retail industry, because oil price has an effect on discretionary
income; and the precious metals sector, where high oil prices
might be associated with political uncertainty
In Table 3, at the 60 month forecast horizon, shocks to U.S.
oil production account for statistically significant 4.7%, 9.6%, 4.7%
and 5.0% of the variation in real returns in the petroleum and
natural gas, automobile, retail and precious metals industries,
respectively. U.S. oil production does not mainly predict returns of
the petroleum and natural gas industry, but contains information
for retail spending, for purchases in the automotive sector, and for
uncertainty reflected in demand for precious metals. In results not
2 In generating results, a U.S. sector real return replaces U.S. real stock return in
Eq. (1). The data are at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html.
180 W. Kang et al. / Economics Letters 145 (2016) 176–181Table 3
Forecast error variance decomposition of U.S. real stock market return by industry: 1973:01–2014:12.
Horizon Non-U.S. oil supply
shock





Panel 1. Petroleum and natural gas
1 0.002 (0.18) 0.001 (0.05) 0.011 (0.69) 0.026 (1.23) 0.961 (31.47)
12 0.030 (1.64) 0.022 (1.03) 0.044 (2.01) 0.060 (2.42) 0.845 (21.74)
60 0.050 (2.57) 0.047 (1.93) 0.061 (2.77) 0.088 (3.70) 0.754 (18.94)
Panel 2. Automobiles and trucks
1 0.000 (0.03) 0.003 (0.28) 0.000 (0.00) 0.031 (1.20) 0.966 (32.08)
12 0.010 (0.73) 0.052 (1.51) 0.054 (2.47) 0.081 (2.76) 0.802 (17.40)
60 0.049 (2.37) 0.096 (2.67) 0.069 (3.19) 0.120 (3.98) 0.666 (15.12)
Panel 3. Retail
1 0.000 (0.03) 0.001 (0.05) 0.000 (0.01) 0.019 (1.02) 0.980 (40.14)
12 0.023 (1.19) 0.014 (0.81) 0.021 (1.29) 0.045 (1.95) 0.896 (25.08)
60 0.054 (2.35) 0.047 (1.99) 0.032 (1.82) 0.069 (2.93) 0.799 (20.66)
Panel 4. Precious metals
1 0.003 (0.30) 0.003 (0.18) 0.002 (0.31) 0.012 (0.80) 0.980 (38.57)
12 0.022 (1.29) 0.036 (1.54) 0.020 (1.25) 0.039 (1.89) 0.883 (25.35)
60 0.041 (2.10) 0.050 (2.11) 0.058 (2.59) 0.048 (2.35) 0.804 (20.25)
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return across industries. The values in parentheses
represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients’ standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.Table 4
Forecast error variance decomposition of real U.S. stock market return across industries with consolidated world oil supply shock:
1973:01–2014:12.
Horizon World oil supply shock Aggregate demand shock Oil-market specific
demand shock
Other shock
Panel 1. Petroleum and natural gas
1 0.001 (0.08) 0.008 (0.47) 0.040 (1.55) 0.952 (29.02)
12 0.029 (1.56) 0.037 (1.70) 0.071 (2.55) 0.863 (23.02)
60 0.053 (2.51) 0.063 (2.63) 0.099 (3.59) 0.786 (20.24)
Panel 2. Automobiles and trucks
1 0.001 (0.07) 0.001 (0.16) 0.011 (0.61) 0.987 (44.56)
12 0.011 (0.78) 0.061 (2.41) 0.070 (2.43) 0.859 (22.89)
60 0.056 (2.44) 0.081 (3.31) 0.110 (3.50) 0.753 (18.74)
Panel 3. Retail
1 0.002 (0.15) 0.000 (0.00) 0.009 (0.64) 0.989 (47.53)
12 0.024 (1.24) 0.023 (1.31) 0.031 (1.57) 0.922 (29.15)
60 0.060 (2.39) 0.032 (1.69) 0.061 (2.56) 0.847 (23.03)
Panel 4. Precious metals
1 0.003 (0.27) 0.002 (0.17) 0.016 (0.92) 0.980 (43.49)
12 0.021 (1.30) 0.020 (1.14) 0.036 (1.72) 0.923 (29.08)
60 0.039 (1.98) 0.060 (2.38) 0.045 (2.08) 0.856 (21.32)
Notes: Percent contributions of structural shocks to the variability of real stock market return across industries. The values in parentheses
represent the absolute t-statistics when coefficients’ standard errors were generated using a recursive-design wild bootstrap.shown, impulse response functions indicate that the magnitude
of response in the returns in the automobile (negative effect) and
precious metals (positive effect) industries to a negative U.S. oil
production shock are particularly large (Results are available upon
request).
Identifying world oil production by non-U.S. and U.S. compo-
nents has a dramatic effect on the ability of oil supply shocks to
forecast industry returns. Over the 60 month horizon, oil produc-
tion shocks (U.S. and non-U.S.) forecast 9.7%, 14.5%, 10.1% and 9.1%
of the variation in real stock returns of the petroleum and natu-
ral gas, automobile, retail and precious metals industries, respec-
tively, in Table 3. In contrast, in a model in which oil production is
consolidated as world oil production, supply shocks forecast only
5.3%, 5.6%, 6.0% and 3.9% of the variation in real stock returns of the
petroleum and natural gas, automobile, retail and precious metals
industries, respectively, as shown in Table 4. Identifying oil pro-
duction shocks originating outside and inside the U.S. is particu-
larly important for forecasting returns in the automobile and truck
industry.5. Conclusion
In this paper we show the importance of distinguishing
between U.S. and non-U.S. oil supply shocks for understanding the
impact of structural shocks in the oil market on U.S. real stock
returns. Shocks to U.S. oil production are positively associated
with U.S. real stock returns and the link is statistically significant
in the fourteenth month and later. This is a stronger result than
that obtained by estimating the model over a sample period
ending before the start of the production of shale oil in 2007.
This highlights the importance of separating the influences of
U.S. and non-U.S. oil production on real stock returns in recent
years. In contrast to the results reported in Kilian and Park (2009),
oil demand and supply shocks are of comparable importance in
explainingU.S. real stock returnswhen supply shocks fromU.S. and
non-U.S. oil production are identified. Distinguishing between U.S.
and non-U.S. oil supply shocks is also important to understanding
the effects of oil supply shocks on industries’ real stock returns,
especially for the automobile and truck industry.
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Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.008.
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